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i
Abstract

This paper aims to highlight the impact of democratization on wasta by examining the
everyday performance of wasta, or the use of connections and informal networks to acquire
services. Despite its widespread use, I find that it is understudied as an explanatory variable in
the literature on democratization and authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa,
with Tunisia as a case study. In this paper, I argue that wasta can potentially have a
consolidating effect on regimes. I examine the ways that wasta is encoded in everyday
language. Using literature from Pragmatics, specifically Goffman’s dramaturgical model, I find
that Tunisians’ discursive world view reveals the power dynamics that underly the performance
of wasta. I close with a research agenda that examines common approaches to studying wasta
and how they can be improved by integrating an ethnographic lens.
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ANC: National Constituent Assembly
IVD: Truth and Dignity Commission
RCD: Democratic Constitutional Rally
SNFSI: National Syndicate of Internal Security Forces
UNDP: United Nations Development Program

As is common in Tunisia and the Maghreb in general, institutions are often referred to by their French
acronyms.
1

1
Part One
Introduction
He who gave his word to someone, also gave them his life.2
Do like your neighbor or move out.3
Tunisian proverbs

In late December 2010, the Tunisian people toppled a 23-year regime who had made
any form of dissent, private or public, exceedingly dangerous. Strict censorship governed
public spaces, with complex structures put in place to control literary production, the media,
and other realms of life. In other words, collective imagination was tightly surveilled and
policed4. However, the large-scale protests that broke out in late December saw thousands
of people take to the street and defy police violence to demand “dignity, freedom, social
justice”5. Eight years later, Tunisia’s democratic transition became one of its biggest selling
points: successful election of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) that passed a new
constitution considered the most progressive in the region, free and fair democratic elections
of a president and a parliament, and the country’s first ever local elections of municipal
councils in each of the country’s 24 governorates6. However, how much has really changed
in people’s everyday lives? Of the everyday processes that have survived the democratic

Original: إللّي عطا كلمتو عطا رقبتو.
Original: أعمِ لْ كيف جارك وإال حول باب دارك.
4 This paper’s main case study is Tunisia, which is my only country of citizenship and where I lived until 2017.
My own experiences with authoritarianism, wasta, and protests will heavily inform my knowledge of this case
study.
5 Many of their chants were then picked up by other states in the region, becoming emblems of freedom of
speech.
6 Municipal Council members used to be appointed rather than elected.
2
3

2
overhaul, what can their study tell us about the opportunities and obstacles that social
movements are faced with in the future?
‘willis from tunis’ [sic] is the nom de plume of Tunisian cartoonist Nadia Khiari
whose political satire has become popular ever since the first 2011 protests broke out. Her
protagonist, Willis “The Cat of the Revolution” (Grillmeier 2018) is a humanoid character
that the artist uses to voice her critique of authoritarianism, social inequality, and political
absurdities. One of Khiari’s recent cartoons is worth examining as it nicely informs the rest
of this paper.
The October 2018 piece has two scenes (willis from tunis 2018). The first reveals
Willis, paws in the air and lips tightly muffling a cry as a tear escapes his eye and a
policeman’s black boot pins his head to the ground with the caption “Avant la révolution, c’était
ça” (“Before the Revolution, we had this”). The same scene is repeated again, except this
time around Willis is crying audibly in pain, “Aaaaïïïe” under the caption “Mais aujourd’hui,
heureusement, on a la liberté d’expression !” (“But luckily today we have freedom of expression!”).
This visual representation juxtaposes change and continuity to reveal a striking reality about
life in Tunisia after the political transition: newfound freedoms, like freedom of expression
and freedom to protest, but within an immutable police state.

3
Figure 1. willis from tunis (2018)

There have been constant reports of use of excessive force against civilians and
death under police custody due to torture (e.g. Chebaane 2019). Kimball (2019) writes that in
light of the country’s democratic opening, the police created their first union, the National
Syndicate of Internal Security Forces, SNFSI (2019). While this is justified as a way for the
police to improve their working conditions and security, many Tunisians are skeptical and
think that this is one of the ways that the police are trying to cover their tracks and their
history of abuse and continued impunity (Kimball 2019).
In 2014, the then-president Moncef Marzouki launched the Truth and Dignity
Commission (the IVD) to investigate state violations since 1955 (UNDP 2014). Fida
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Hammami, a Tunisian researcher at Amnesty International, reports that “police unions have
also been very hostile to the IVD [which] summons officers that might be involved in cases
they’re investigating. [The unions] have encouraged their members not to cooperate”
(Kimball 2019). The police state, however, is not the only aspect of pre-2011 Tunisia that
has remained largely intact. This paper follows a bottom-up approach by centering citizens’
interactions with the state and its institutions, specifically in the way that they approach
service provisions and acquiring benefits. This means looking at the most common way that
services are provided: connections, or wasta. As will be argued later, violence is not the only
way that obedience is enforced. I conclude that wasta is one of the ways that the state
exercises power even when it doesn’t do so through physical threat.

What is Wasta?
Hans Wehr (1993) defines wasta as “mediator, intermediary, medium, expedient”
(1067). It was originally used to describe those who mediate conflict at the family,
communal, or wider tribal level (Lackner 2016). Also referred to as ‘vitamin waw’7, wasta has
no exact translation in English which explains the wide use of the Arabic loan word. Lackner
(2016) lists the following terms that are often used to refer to wasta in the Anglophone
world, “patronage, nepotism, touting, brokerage, rent-seeking, clientelism and cronyism, as
well as gatekeepers and expediters” (35). However, as she rightly notes, this lack of a direct
equivalent can potentially reinforce negative interpretations of the practice of wasta. In this
paper, I argue that this actually contributes to several issues.

This is used mostly in Levantine dialects of Arabic, especially Jordan and Palestine. ‘Waw’ is the transliteration
of the letter و, or ‘w’, in reference to the first letter of the word ‘wasta’.
7
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Wasta is too often seen as a ‘form’ of corruption (Anderson 2016; Sadi 2017;
Ramady 2017). This isn’t necessarily true, as oftentimes no law is technically being broken
(Doughan 2017). However, the implications of this lack of conceptual clarity involve
inadequate policy responses that overemphasize legal reform at the expense of distributive
justice (Doughan 2017).
For the purposes of this paper, I use Lackner’s (2016) definition which captures how
ordinary people understand wasta “the mediator uses his inﬂuence with a state or private
provider to assist the other party in obtaining something which she/he may or may not be
entitled to” (35). I add that wasta is often used to obtain that which the party is very much
entitled to, but bureaucratic obstacles would might make too costly (money and time-wise).
Doughan (2017) notes that wasta is not unique to the Middle East and North Africa. It has
equivalents like blat in Russia (Ledeneva 1998), raccomandazione in Italy (Zinn 2001), pulling
strings in the United States, protektzia in Israel (Danet 1989), Beziehungen in Germany, and
guanxi in China (Nuijten and Anders 2007). In the Maghreb, the French term piston is much
more common than the term ‘wasta’, but they are direct equivalents.
Understood as such, wasta takes a much bigger significance than its more restricted
applications elections or parliamentary politics. It can be applied to other areas as well, such
as labor politics and the role of labor unions, banking and debt, and finally, bureaucratic
services (e.g. renewing passports, IDs, obtaining birth certificates, construction licenses,
access to public hospitals, etc.). I argue that these areas are central to the negotiation of
power and citizenship, in authoritarian regimes and during democratization periods.8

My discussion of wasta applies to administrations and the banking sector. I only suggest ways that future
research can examine labor unions, because of logistic limitations that have to do with unavailability of data at
this stage.
8
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Why Should we Care?
The significance of this issue goes beyond a mere intellectual exercise. The Middle
East and North Africa, the Arab World, or the Near East, etc. is a region that is hardly
afforded any cultural and political subtleties in the media and so in people’s imagination. It’s
easy to stereotype and categorize such a diverse and dynamic region when researchers
unsarcastically use terms such as “Arab corruption” (Warf 2018) to essentialize the so-called
“Arab World” implying that some inherent trait makes their brand of corruption different
from any other around the world. This leads to using metaphors of “endemic” infectious
diseases that need a “war” to be “eradicated” (Yerkes and Muasher 2017).
This paper seeks to disambiguate one of the most widespread phenomena in the
Middle East and North Africa without further contributing to the ‘othering’ of a whole
region. By historicizing wasta, we can understand that though it is ‘informal’, it has its
internal rules and structure. Seen as a byproduct of the hybridization of colonial bureaucracy
and a tribal, kin-based social infrastructure, wasta stands out not as an extra-legal practice but
a natural evolution of colonial structures.
Differentiating wasta from corruption does not seek to attribute a positive value
judgement to wasta. It contributes to understanding the structures that ordinary people
operate in. It also provides a better understanding of how citizens view their representatives
and their political role. In other words, this paper’s ultimate goal is to fill the gap that the
literature on corruption and political clientelism have neglected: democratization does not
solve the structural inequalities in which wasta thrives.

7
Wasta in the Literature
Wasta and Political Clientelism
Political clientelism is defined by Stokes (2011) as “the proffering of material goods
in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is
simply: did you (will you) support me?” (2). This is clearly one of the ways that wasta can be
understood—political wasta. The literature on political clientelism is vast and extremely rich,
especially as it pertains to Latin America whose electoral politics rely heavily on vote buying
and brokerage (Stokes 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). This relationship typically
involves an unequal exchange, which is both voluntary and exploitative (Stokes 2011). Early
studies have established that the “cement” in this paradoxical relationship is a moral norm of
reciprocity which prevents defection (Gouldner 1960). This applies to everyday wasta as
well. How different are wasta and political clientelism?
When it comes to the Middle East and North Africa, studies on political clientelism
are few and far between. As widespread as wasta is throughout the region, this in not
necessarily reflected in the literature on the Middle East and North Africa. Most works look
at elite level wasta, or political clientelism. For example, in her seminal work, Lust (2009)
argues that in authoritarian regimes, elections are hardly ever about reimagining the rules of
the game. Legislative elections in countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt were held not
for the purpose of negotiating democratization. All parties were aware that “elections are
best thought of as competitions over access to state resources, or ‘competitive clientelism,’
and the candidates and voters alike recognize this” (124). This is a significant observation,
especially as Lust’s arguments applies to MPs who enjoy invaluable perks like political
immunity, allowing them to abuse resources and connections in complete impunity in the
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absence of accountability mechanisms. It also explains why parties go through the trouble of
becoming potential targets of autocrats when they are already aware that their cause is lost.
Regardless, overemphasizing elite-level wasta draws attention away from “ordinary” wasta
that happens within the bounds of the law, but which has far-reaching consequences. This
view “from below” is needed to understand the viewpoint of “clients” who are seeking
services they may not be entitled to or would be too costly (financially and time-wise) were
they to follow standard procedure without the prior knowledge of a “patron” who would
facilitate the whole process.

Clients’ Point of View
The bulk of seminal research on clientelism prioritizes elite perspectives (Benstead
2016; Blaydes 2008; Gans‐Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014; Hachemaoui 2013; Liddell
2010; Lust 2009; Piattoni 2001; Richter 2007). Clients’ perspective has received more
attention recently in Political Science, however works in other fields such as Sociology and
Anthropology have already tried to piece out why and how citizens (especially poor people)
choose to engage in clientelistic relationships (Auyero 1999, 2000, 2001). Beyond political
clientelism and vote-buying, there is hardly any research on “everyday” wasta in the Middle
East and North Africa unless it is cast within a discourse of ‘fighting corruption’9 or
examining political clientelism.
More recently, some works have started looking at clients’ perspectives in clientelistic
regimes. However, this is still restricted to electoral politics (Pellicer et al. 2017; Pellicer et al.
2018) and studies are still surprisingly scarce. Again, Political Science remains behind on

9

To the best of my knowledge.
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looking at clientelism “from below”. As I argue later in this paper, this is due to a lack of
methodological diversity which overemphasizes elite-level analysis at the expense of microlevel interactions.
The small literature that deals with wasta per se largely looks at it in the GCC as a
problem of leadership and business management (Berger et al. 2015; Velez‐Calle, Robledo‐
Ardila, and Rodriguez‐Rios 2015; Amin Mohamed and Hamdy 2008; Smith et al. 2012;
Loewe et al. 2007; Al-Ramahi 2008). While these insights are valuable for understanding the
climate in which access to employment opportunities takes place, they fall short of
explaining how the often well-connected, but unqualified, job candidates contribute to
reproducing the power dynamics upon which authoritarian regimes are built. Studies that
look at social categories such as class and gender within wasta are rare, one of which is Bailey
(2012) who uses focus groups with Emirati women to argue that despite religious arguments
against wasta10, gender and class intersect to doubly marginalize women from access to
opportunities. This is an example of the “dark” side of wasta—those who are deprived of
patriarchal and class privilege.

The Case of Tunisia
The surprising lack of work on wasta also applies to the case study at hand, Tunisia.
The fall of Ben Ali’s regime opened the way for research that would not have been possible
pre-2011. Political Islam has been a popular topic among researchers, asking questions about
the compatibility of Islam and democracy (Kadlec 2016; Schwedler 2011; Cavatorta and

In fact, Amin Mohamed and Hamdy (2008) have surveyed religious texts and argued that when people have
negative attitudes against wasta, it is due to Islam’s condemnation of corruption.
10
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Merone 2013; Lounnas 2016; Ghannouchi 2016; Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013; Hamid
2018; Rohr 2011; Ounissi and Marks 2016; Wegner and Cavatorta 2018; Wolf 2017) and the
future of gender in an Islamic democracy (de Silva de Alwis, Mnasri, and Ward 2017; Cordall
and Mahmood 2017; Sadiqi 2016; Moghadam 2016; Muhanna-Matar 2015; Khalil 2014;
Badran 2013; Pruzan-Jørgensen 2012; Marks 2012; Gray 2012; Marks 2011; Coleman 2011).
To be clear, these research questions are of utmost importance because of the fragility of the
Tunisian transition and the need to investigate issues that had been impossible to raise
before because it was too dangerous, people were too afraid to speak, or politicians were
extremely untrustworthy because of their loyalty to the ruling party, the RCD (the
Democratic Constitutional Rally). However, the trend is clear: everyday citizens’ experiences
of the transition are understudied.
Because of this gap in the literature, this paper aims to expand the literature on
democratization and everyday politics by centering the perception of those seeking wasta as
well as those providing it. As I will explain, outside of vote-buying, wasta in Tunisia is
oftentimes reciprocal. The most precarious wasta scenario is not simply when someone has
no connections to get around, but when they do not signal to their wasta that they can repay
the favor (sooner or later).

Methodology and Limitations
In addition to using primary and secondary sources, this paper uses a mixed-methods
research design. I rely on my deep personal knowledge of Tunisia to report typical wasta
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scenarios. My fluency in Tunisian Derja is also helpful in surveying popular expressions
that people use to refer to wasta. Using this selection of linguistic data, I make a
sociolinguistic argument on the linguistic encoding of wasta and what the latter reveals about
Tunisian everyday politics and the negotiation of power. In the last chapter, I suggest a
research agenda that centers ethnographic data. This will be mainly based on literature on
political ethnography.
Because of lack of funding, in-person interviews were not possible. Several attempts
to do phone interviews have failed because of time difference and general mistrust. This is
unsurprising, considering the contested nature of wasta. Instead, I chose to have this fruitless
experience inform my research agenda to argue for better ways that wasta can be studied.

Derja refers to the colloquial language spoken in Tunisia. Its language status is still debated, with most people
referring to as a dialect of Arabic. In this paper, I refer to it as a language because it violates the principle of
mutual intelligibility when compared to Levantine dialects.
11
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Part Two
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the widespread use of wasta in Tunisia as we
know it is a result of the legacies of colonialism and post-colonial governments’ authoritarian
policies that undermined kin-based structures in order to implement a modernist project.

The Colonial and the Postcolonial
In “Notes on the (Post)Colonial in the Maghreb” (2009), Hannoum argues that
“colonialism has introduced and imposed its own webs of significance into the colonies and
[shows] the conditions under which the colonized became caught in webs of significance
that they themselves had not spun” (324). Hannoum presents what he calls “a preliminary
investigation on how the colonial continues in the contemporary Maghreb” (325). He
engages an anthropological critique of the discourse of both colonialism and nationalism.
Through examples from the colonial historiography of the Maghreb, i.e. colonial knowledge
as power wielding, the national elite, literary and cultural productions, and finally postcolonial historiography, Hannoum deconstructs nationalist claims of regeneration after
independence. Instead, he argues that a more fitting dichotomy is that of the pre-colonial
versus the (post)colonial.
Before the French colonized the Maghreb, they engaged in an enormous process of
knowledge restructuring. Hannoum argues that before the introduction of the Arab Bureau
(Hannoum 2008), a French colonial body which produced ethnographic and historiographic
literature on the Maghreb in general but Algeria in particular, historical texts distinguished
the Maghreb by a striking racial diversity: “Jews, Turks, Moors, Coloughli [descendants of
Turkish fathers and Moorish mothers], Berbers, and Arabs” (326). French historiographic
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literature produced texts that reduced the racial makeup of North Africa to a dichotomy of
Berber versus Arab. Berbers physically resembled white Europeans, and as such they were
depicted as primitive ancestors to the modern French come to the rescue—to unification.
The colonial discourse “concentrated around the nation and used the opposition Arab
versus Berber to demonstrate the impossibility of nationhood in the Maghreb” (328). Both
Berbers and Arabs, nomadic by tradition, “cannot conceive of existence beyond the tribe”
and so tribalism became a symbol for their primitiveness and backwardness. Nationhood,
then, was the mark of modernity, civility, and national progress (Hannoum 2009).
These categories apply to the introduction of bureaucratic processes into the
colonies which created a conflict in the “native’” traditions. Traditionally, tribes were the
dominant social categories, and tribe elders would play the role of ‘wasta’ in mediating
conflict within their tribe or in relation to other tribes. Social interactions are, thus, extremely
personal and a person’s biggest capital is their social standing. Antoun (2000) argues that
tribal structures serve the purpose of forming trust and “accomplishing social goals” (444).
Explaining the variation in family law conservatism in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco,
Charrad (2001) writes that Bourguiba12 sidelined tribe leaders upon independence from the
French in 1956. He believed that their primitive structures and beliefs would hold back his
project of a modern, progressive Tunisia. Admittedly, he was a centrist whose politics
angered the more revolutionary tribal groups whose identity was antithetical to the colonial
project (Christian, white, Francophone, rational, etc.).
Accessing services, like employment, obtaining and renewing identification
documents, and securing positions in training programs and such became standard

12

Tunisia’s first president.
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procedures. In theory, these services are impersonal and non-discriminating, yet approval is
often acquired, or in most cases, expedited through wasta that is often family-based. The
result of this structure is entrenched inequalities because of the margin that wasta allows for
the abuse of social capital.

The Evolution of Wasta
Speaking in the context of the MENA region, Barnett et al. (2013) distinguish
between what they call “old wasta” and “new wasta”:
With old wasta, the tribal leader sought to gain an advantage on behalf of the tribal group so
that wasta worked from top down. New wasta, while still yielding advantage for the tribal
group, works from bottom up. Moreover, with old wasta tribal elders and leaders gained
status and authority via their role as middlemen. This source of status and authority is largely
lost with new wasta. (43)

This distinction is important to understand how wasta changed with the evolution of
tribes. In Tunisia today, it is easy to determine a person’s tribal belonging as well as where
their ancestors originally came from just by knowing their last name. As such, it is common
to refuse service to a person if the employee has personal prejudice against a person of a
certain tribal ancestry. The employee might oblige begrudgingly, but the person seeking the
service would most probably be dealing with the “dark” side of wasta—endless referrals, and
the famous Tunisian response “come back tomorrow”13 or “the person in charge is out of
office and will be back this afternoon”14.
13
14

أرجع غدوة
All parties involved know that it’s a decoy, and there is no point in coming back in the afternoon.
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Is Wasta a Form of Corruption?
Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for
private gain. Corruption can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the
amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs.” It also defines petty corruption as:
Everyday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary
citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals,
schools, police departments and other agencies.

Based on this definition, it can be understood that this involves wasta as well. After
all, it does involve abusing entrusted power and controlling access to basic goods and
services. However, in this section I argue that wasta is different from corruption.
Examining Tunisian Derja, I find that expressions that refer to wasta are often used
in a way that does not differentiate between corruption and wasta. At a surface level, this
could mean that Tunisians are so desensitized to corruption that their linguistic encoding of
their worldview normalizes petty corruption. However, this section draws from
Sociolinguistics and Pragmatics to argue that the casual everyday references to wasta give
insight into how people think of power and access to resources.

Linguistic Encoding of Wasta
In Table 1, I present as selection of Tunisian expressions that are used every day in
response to prompts that have to do with accessing jobs and services, followed by an
analytical commentary on this data.
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a.
b.
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Table 1. Expressions in Tunisian Derja
Original
Translation
(X) sent me
)بعثني (فالن
(X) contacted you about me
)كلمك عليا (فالن
I’m here for the (merchandise/service)
جيتك على هاك القضية
A mix of French and Arabic: BenAmmiste, a person who uses family
بن عميست
connections. Could also be used to
describe those who use wasta (either client
or patron)
Literally “from there to there?”. Used in
response to lack of respect to hierarchy,
من غادي لغادي؟
status, etc.
(X) has some robust wasta
(فالن) عندو االكتاف
Son-in-law
النسيب
A hospitable person (reference to how
Une personne serviable
well they respond to wasta)
You’re welcome any time
 مرحبا بيك في كل وقت،تفضل
I can tell from your/their face (e.g. this
الناس بوجوهها
person looks/seems trustworthy)
Literally ‘goodie bag’ / colloquially:
القفة
sycophancy

This selection of common expressions used on a daily basis in Tunisia speaks
volumes about how public servants, namely employees in state administrations (like the
postal office, the municipality, police station, etc.), “perform” wasta.
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman (1959) develops his ‘dramaturgical
model’. This model is based on Melancholy Jacques’s soliloquy in As You Like It. In the
famous opening lines, Jacques declares “All the world’s a stage / And all the men and
women merely players”. Goffman argues, thus, that our public selves are continually adapted
to fit the image that we want to project about ourselves and to fit the social setting of the
interaction. The American Psychological Association defines situated identity theory as “the
theory that individuals take on different roles in different social and cultural settings, so that
a person’s behavior pattern may shift radically according to the situation and the others with
whom he or she is interacting” (APA). Goffman’s concept of the performative self, which
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builds on situated identity theory, can be applied in this case to understand the performance
of wasta, specifically how employees in public administration play both the role of a client or
a wasta, depending on who they’re speaking to.
Based on the preceding selection of expressions commonly used to refer to wasta, I
identify three central elements of wasta: announcement, respect for hierarchy, and
reputation.

Announcement of Wasta
Wasta has its internal rules. Announcing it is of utmost importance. The first three
expressions are the most common ones used to announce wasta, usually declaring the name
of the wasta, or the mediator, that established this connection. Prior knowledge on the part
of the employee is not always necessary. In fact, it depends on how close the mediator is to
the employee. If their relationship is robust, they would trust that whoever announces the
name of the mediator were indeed ‘sent’ by said mediator. However, if a wasta is not direct,
or was established through another wasta, prior knowledge would be needed. This unspoken
rule is established to protect against false wasta: citizen A could lie about their wasta in the
hopes of having their service fulfilled.

Hierarchy
Respect for hierarchy is an essential element of wasta. This is due, not simply to real
hierarchy within administrations, but to lower-ranked employees overstepping the limits of
their influence to serve or refuse service. Expression number 7 is a classic example of a
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wasta-type interaction where a citizen could offend a doorman by simply greeting them
without sharing the purpose of their visit or who they are. In this case, the doorman’s
situated identity projects a higher status than he actually has.
If a citizen uses wasta to approach employee A, but the latter is out of office16, the
service would be delegated to the person higher up (employee B) in terms of hierarchy.
Rarely would it be a person of equal or lower status. Fulfilling the request also depends on
the impression that employee B has of employee A’s, or whether or not there is preexistent
conflict. Therefore, this can be the citizen’s lucky day because they could be accidentally
referred to someone with bigger prerogatives, or they can have wasta backfire. Little
attention is usually given to how urgent is the citizen’s need for the service is or to the
principle of impartiality upon which bureaucracies are built.
Figure 2 below represents the possible scenarios that could take place when wasta is
in action.

Reputation
Wasta is highly personalistic and it is similar to the general understanding of
clientelism as a contingent/reciprocal process. As Hicken notes, “the delivery of a good or
service on the part of both the patron and client is in direct response to a delivery of a
reciprocal beneﬁt by the other party, or the credible promise of such a beneﬁt” (291). In the
case of wasta, more weight is given to the ‘promise’ of reciprocity. As such, a person’s
reputation depends on how well they peddle connections and serve citizens who arrive to

Men almost always are employed as doormen.
As is often the case with administration employees, who are often “away on business” when in fact they
could be on a cigarette break.
15
16
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his/her office through wasta. Expressions 6, 8, 10, apply to this element of wasta.
Expression 6, “(X) has robust wasta” reveals that people take pride in being well-connected.
This in turn, contributes to the strength of their own ‘promise of reciprocity’ in the eyes of a
patron. Expression 8 is indeed a major compliment any administration official can receive. It
does not refer to hospitality in the typical sense of the word. Describing someone as
‘serviable’, means they are likely to prioritize those who are backed up by wasta, at the expense
of those who approach him/her with a meager form or application dossier in hand. Lastly,
describing someone as ‘Ben-Ammiste’ carries the understanding that they are most probably
receiving bribes for the service, not only responding to wasta for the sake of social capital.
Figure 2. Common wasta scenario
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Party Politics and Wasta
The Political Economy of Wasta
In her seminal book, The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia,
Béatrice Hibou (2011) writes one of the most compelling works on the role of the banking
sector in reproducing authoritarian structures. After 9 years of fieldwork, she writes about
how interconnected all sectors are: banking, political discourse, and international
organizations’ complicity in Ben Ali’s police state.
She argues that contending with the explanation of the oppressive relationship
between the people and Ben Ali as a vertical one based on the use of violence and coercion
tells only part of the story. “No government is exclusively based on violence and
repression,” she writes (11). Her aim is “to understand, over and beyond the most brutal
repression, the modes of government and the concrete economic apparatuses of power that
render constraint painless and even invisible” (9).
In other words, the book shows how the regime is set up in a way that cultivates in
people a ‘desire’ for integration into this system. This integration guarantees them social
mobility and economic opportunities as they participate in the weaving of the “fiction” of
modernization and economic security. Wasta, in this context, is one of the features of Ben
Ali’s world that carries over from before 2011 to this day. Trying to decipher the workings
of everyday wasta falls under a tradition of politics “from below”. It is an example of
Foucauldian power relations: ambivalent, negotiated, and constantly contested.
Because wasta remains a striking feature of Tunisian society, democratization could
potentially exacerbate it. Before 2011, all wasta goes through the RCD and its members.
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Administration officials’ “situated identities” are of RCD-istes first, and citizens second. This
created a thick barrier between political dissent and access to basic services. If the RCD
learned that a citizen disapproves of any state policy, then the wasta ‘machinery’
automatically shuts its doors. Any “mediator” would be endangering their livelihood and
their family’s if they helped someone with a political reputation.
Hibou’s insights into the banking system show how it revolves around bad debt and
normalizes it, and how every participant from politicians to businessmen to average citizens
depend on it—in her words, “power by credit, life on credit” (183). The banking sector is
deeply social: businesses get loans only if they have enough social capital, not according to
objective economic metrics of risk assessment. In other words, the success of any business
depends on how well they behave within the ruling party. Abstention is seen as dissent and
so is punished the same way—exclusion.

Change and Continuity
Hibou’s study is even more striking when the banking system is examined, now, 8
years after the fall of the RCD; no reforms have been put into place to change how loans are
allocated. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the same mechanisms that she describes in
the first quarter of this decade remain mostly unchanged. As she recounts, Ben Ali’s rule was
associated with the Tunisian ‘economic miracle’, a myth he reinforced by constantly
showcasing ad nauseam, both to the country and the world, several fabricated figures as
evidence of economic prosperity. This ‘Tunisian miracle’ was consolidated through an
official discourse of exceptionalism, modernity, and security17.
For more details, see Amnesty International’s June 2009 report entitled “Tunisia: Behind Tunisia's
'Economic Miracle': Inequality and Criminalization of Protest”
17
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I argue that the survival of this myth of economic prosperity can be explained by the
gap it fills: it responds to people’s aspirations and gives meaning to an everyday life of
control and surveillance. And it rests on what Hibou calls a ‘security pact’ (181). She stresses
that this ‘pact’ should not be understood as an exchange, it is rather
The assurance of order and tranquility… the Tunisian authorities thus make it a point of
honor to enumerate the benefits that they are bestowing on their middle classes, and it is no
coincidence that speeches focus on precisely this dimension: growth annually rises to around
five percent, fostering a real development in the country; nearly 80 percent of families own
their own accommodation; cars are made more popular both by programs that provide
purchasing aid and, in periods when petrol prices go up, by oil subsidies; electrification and
water conveyance affect over 90 percent of the population; telephones are increasingly
accessible, as is the internet; birth rates have fallen and demographic growth has been limited
thanks to an active family planning policy; etc. the Plan is the main indicator of the pact’s
effectiveness: as a technique of assessment, it attempts to order everything so that the
objective of security can be attained” (183).

Hibou’s book presents a rare analysis of Ben Ali’s rule in particular, and domination
in general. It remains perhaps one of the best works on Tunisia, and not many interrogate
power the way that her work does. It shows how every aspect of everyday life revolves
around the ruling party. It is difficult, almost impossible, to do anything without being under
the watchful eye of the party, whether real or perceived.
What Hibou’s argument shows is that power can be reified, not through weapons,
but through controlling the public and what they perceive as ‘normal’. How much can a
“democratic transition” achieve in the absence of progressive structural reforms that could
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perhaps make wasta obsolete? Without structural reforms (not simply legal amendments),
the state continues to hamper citizen’s prosperity and perpetuate dependence on its wasta.

Wasta After 2011
The previous section attempted to go beyond the simple understanding of wasta as
corruption and show how, even when following legal procedures, it can still be a way that
the state imposes obedience. It also showed how at the lowest level of everyday interaction,
power is reified through the need that it creates: in the case of wasta, it creates dependence
on state officials, personalistic ties, and arbitrary fulfillment of basic services. This section
asks: how much has changed since the fall of the ruling party? I argue that democratization
caused a reshuffling of social capital and the end of the RCD’s monopoly over wasta, yet it
has not addressed the root causes of wasta.
I explain the persistence of wasta using French theorist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of
habitus. It is “a way of describing the embodiment of social structures and history in
individuals. It is a set of dispositions, internal to the individual, that both reflects external
social structures and shapes how the individual perceives the world and acts in it.” (Power
1999, 48–49; emphasis added). The interaction between the social context and the
individual’s internalization of it can make it exceedingly difficult to simply “shake off” 23
years of autocratic rule and what it entails like fear, conditioned social relations, policed
discourse, censored thoughts, threat of violence, and selective propaganda.
In other words, complicated bureaucratic procedures combine with highly
personalistic means to acquire services and create the most pervasive means of non-violent
oppression: the administration. What makes it so pervasive is the fact that it creates demand.
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Tunisians are so accustomed to using wasta that despite its drawbacks, it remains highly
sought after.
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Part Three
Research Agenda
Perhaps the lack of attention to wasta is due to the research methods commonly
used in the Middle East and North Africa. In this section, I develop a research agenda that
rethinks how we study wasta in a way that respects its internal logic.

Surveys and Public Opinion
The Arab Barometer is the most robust cross-national survey of the Middle East and
North Africa currently in use. Its four waves have been heavily cited in Political Science
research on the region to understand changes in public opinion over time. One of its
strengths is the repetition of questions from one wave to another in order to observe trends.
Unfortunately, this does not apply to wasta. In fact, the Arab Barometer rarely refers to
wasta; and when it does, it is to ask whether or not and how often respondents used it. In
fact, only two waves ever use the word ‘wasta’ or connections. However, all waves refer to
corruption, bribery, and the government’s role in curbing both.
Wave I was conducted between 2006 and 2007 in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen. Only three questions mention wasta:
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Figure 3 Questions from 226 and 227 from Wave I

Figure 4 Question 506 from Wave I

Waves II (2010-11; Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen) and III (2012-14; Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen) make no mention of wasta
whatsoever. Finally, Wave IV (2016-17; Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, Tunisia) asks only one question about wasta:
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Figure 5 Question q213 from Wave IV

While I do recognize that these surveys applications can be limited in that they ask
‘what’ but not ‘how’ or ‘why’, I suggest that they have the potential to reveal more insight
about people’s attitudes towards wasta and their perspectives depending on where they
stand: have wasta, don’t have wasta, client, patron, middleperson, administration official,
citizen, man, woman, senior citizen/retiree, etc. Incorporating targeted questions about the
identity of respondents could frame their perspective and give us a better view of how wasta
is perceived depending on how much wasta a person has access to.
Second, surveys can be developed as well as conducted in local dialects, bridging the
gap between what researchers think they are signaling and what respondents are actually
hearing. As mentioned earlier, a person’s attitude towards wasta can depend on where they
stand, or whether they actively benefit from it. When the Arab Barometer asks about
corruption or bribes, respondents can understand it as ‘wasta’ or the other way around.
Making questions more specific could avoid misunderstandings and so, unreliable data.
For example, interviewers could ask if interviewees think that forms and applications
are reliable ways to get services, what means they use to acquire wasta, if wasta is direct or
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indirect (i.e. do they know their wasta directly or is it acquired through a reference), and in
countries like Algeria and Morocco references to the army and the monarchy, respectively,
can also be helpful in showing variation in the type of wasta, etc. Surveys can use more local
terms to refer to wasta. While the word wasta is very common in the Middle East, North
Africans can be more responsive to other terms such as ‘piston’, ‘aktaf’18, or ‘maarifa’19.
In other words, I find that a phenomenon this widespread in the region should enjoy
more probing questions, especially ones that center the respondent’s world view and their
dialect.

Wasta and Political Ethnography
Perhaps the reason that surveys can only go so far in unpacking the politics of wasta
is because of its political nature: admitting one uses wasta depends on which side of wasta
they stand, the privileged or the dispossessed. Asking someone directly about wasta can
cause ‘negative face’ (Goffman 1959) meaning that the survey respondent or the interviewee
can feel embarrassed or questioned. In an authoritarian regime, they can get quite suspicious
and fear persecution. In this section, I argue that because of the controversial nature of
wasta, a better strategy would be to not interrogate directly and impersonally, but rather
observe wasta as it unfolds.
In Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power (2009), Edward
Schatz writes in the introduction that ethnography can be understood in two ways. First, as
participant observation, it can mean “immersion in a community, a cohort, a locale, or a

Aktaf is often used in Tunisia. Its literal translation is ‘shoulders’, a metaphor that uses shoulders as a symbol
for reliability.
19 Maarifa (or maarif as well in Tunsiia) is commonly used across the Maghreb. It means ‘knowledge’, but is used
to refer to connections.
18
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cluster of related subject positions” (5). Second, ethnography can also refer to a “sensibility
that goes beyond face-to-face contact … and [is] an approach that cares—with the possible
emotional engagement that implies—to glean the meanings that the people under study
attribute to their social and political reality” (5). In other words, studying wasta with an
ethnographic lens has the potential to go beyond the first step of establishing the existence
of wasta, its scope, and purposes. In fact, ethnography can unveil the meaning that clients
ascribe to their position in social networks, to their motivation behind pursuing any means
possible to exist within the “web of significance” (Hannoum 2009) that authoritarian
regimes weave.

Conclusion
This paper sought to achieve three things. First, I surveyed the literature on
clientelism and wasta and found a surprising lack of interest in wasta. Second, I tried to parse
out the concept of wasta in its application to the Tunisian administration and bureaucratic
structures to argue that the state’s interests (whether before or after 2011 and the fall of the
ruling party) lie in creating dependence on personalistic ties to enforce discipline and state
obedience. Finally, I develop a modest research agenda and suggest ways that Political
Scientists can improve their research design to better suit the internal logic of wasta.
The limitations of this paper lie in the lack of robust literature that it could have
responded to. In this case, ethnographic data becomes even more important as first-person
experiences are needed to open the way for more research into this valuable phenomenon.
Research can then begin to dig deeper into gender dynamics in wasta. “Old wasta” was
typically exercised by the patriarch of the tribe or family. We can investigate if this still holds
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nowadays and whether or not women operate differently from men. What can this tell us
about women’s negotiation of power and citizenship. In other words, “politics from below”
is key to understanding the future of Tunisian politics.
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